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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

BRYANT COLLARD,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900246-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony, under
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990), and possession of
marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it, a third
degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion to suppress evidence seized from defendant's home pursuant
to a search warrant?
The factual findings underlying the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal
unless they are clearly erroneous.

State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d

1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d

1255, 1258 (Utah 1987)).

When a search warrant is challenged as

having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause,
the reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, the reviewing
court determines only whether the magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed.
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989).

State v.

The reviewing court

should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision.

Ibid.

See also State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), cert, denied, 139 Utah Adv Rep. 16 (Utah 1990).
2.

Was defendant properly convicted and sentenced for

both possession of a controlled substance and possession of
marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it?
Because this issue presents a question of law, this
Court applies a "correction of error" standard of review.

City

of Monticello v. Christensen, 778 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990);
Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional or statutory
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Bryant Collard, was charged with possession
of a controlled substance (marijuana), a third degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990), and possession of
marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it, under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1990) (R. 8-9).
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After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty as
charged (R. 60-61).

The trial court sentenced defendant to the

Utah State Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five years but
suspended those sentences and placed him on thirty-six months'
probation (R. 61-62).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.

The following

summary of the facts is derived from the affidavit supporting the
search warrant, the suppression hearing, and the hearing before
the trial court in which defendant was convicted.
On April 29, 1989, Officers Nielsen and Teuscher of the
Provo City Police Department, acting on a tip from a confidential
informant, intercepted and followed a truck driven by Rex Taylor
(SH. 44, 48-49; Affid. paras. 2-15).

They had reason to believe

that Taylor was transporting and delivering large quantities of
marijuana, in violation of the controlled substances laws (Affid.
para. 3) .
The officers followed Taylor to several locations
around the Provo area and observed apparent drug transactions
(Affid. paras. 5-15).

At approximately 1:10 p.m. that afternoon,

they observed Taylor take "a long a [sic] circuitous route" to
130 East 350 North in Orem, defendant's residence (Affid. paras.

References to "SH." are to the transcript of the suppression
hearing. References to "H." are to the transcript of the hearing
before the trial court in which defendant was convicted. "Affid.
para." refers to paragraphs of the affidavit filed in support of
the application for the search warrant under which the evidence
was seized from defendant's home. Copies of the affidavit and
the search warrant are attached to this brief as Appendix A and
Appendix B, respectively.
-3-

15-17).

At 1:30 p.m., at that address, the officers observed

Taylor deliver "to an unknown white male in his 20's wearing a
bright green shirt, a bag approximately the size of a grocery
bag."

The officers then observed the unidentified man enter "one

of the houses" (Afficl. para. 18). Later that day, after Taylor's
arrest and the impoundment of his truck, 12 to 13 pounds of
marijuana and $25,000 in cash were discovered in the truck
(Affid. para. 22).
Officer Nielsen subsequently prepared and signed an
affidavit setting out the foregoing facts which was submitted to
a magistrate in support of an application for a search warrant to
search defendant's residence (Def. Exh. 1) (Appendix A).

Based

upon that affidavit, the magistrate issued the requested warrant
(Def. Exh. 2) (Appendix B).

In a search of defendant's home, the

police seized 843 grams of marijuana, none of which bore the
appropriate state tax stamp (H. 3-4).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that the magistrate
had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause
existed to support the issuance of a search warrant for
defendant's residence.
Alternatively, even if the affidavit in support of the
search warrant was technically deficient, the trial court
properly denied defendant's motion to suppress because the seized
evidence was admissible under the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984).

.4-

Defendant was erroneously convicted and sentenced for
both possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) and
possession of marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM
HIS RESIDENCE PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT,
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence
pursuant to a search warrant because that warrant was issued on
the basis of an affidavit that did not establish probable cause
2
that his residence contained contraband.

Specifically, he

claims the affidavit failed to identify his residence as the
place which contained the contraband the affiant officer
suspected Rex Taylor delivered to the "unknown white male" at 130
East 350 North, Orem, Utah.

Defendant does not contend that the

affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that Taylor
was transporting and delivering contraband.
A. Sufficiency of the Affidavit
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court
stated:

Defendant's argument is based solely on the fourth amendment;
he does not analyze the suppression issue under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the State will
not address the question of whether the analysis would be
different under the state constitution. See State v. Lafferty,
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will
not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an argument
for different analyses under the state and federal constitutions
are briefed.").
-5-

The affidavit gives detailed information
about a man named Rex Taylor who was
suspected of delivering marijuana for future
distribution. An informant provided a tip
about Taylor. This tip was verified by
police observation. The affidavit describes
a circuitous route with frequent stops and
brief interactions with several individuals.
At the end of this route the police arrested
Taylor who had in his truck large quantities
of marijuana and cash. All of these facts
support a finding that Taylor was in the act
of distributing marijuana. The defendant was
one of the individuals who had a brief
exchange with Taylor. The affidavit states
Taylor arrived at 130 East 350 North, Orem,
Utah[,] where Bryant Coliard resides. It
then describes how Taylor "handed to an
unknown white male in his 20's wearing a
bright green shirt, a bag approximately the
size of a plastic grocery bag. The unknown
white male then turned and walked into one of
the houses," The affidavit does not describe
the defendant or his home in any more detail.
[] However, the search warrant does
describe the house in detail including the
house number on the mailbox attached to the
house. Whether the search warrant
description is adequate depends upon the
facts of each case, and the description is
adequate if the officer with reasonable
effort can identify the place. State v.
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985).
The search warrant description in this case
should be sufficient for determining which
house is to be searched.
[] The discrepency [sic] between the
supporting affidavit and the search warrant
indicates that the house description probably
was mistakenly omited [sic] from the
affidavit. Omitted information must be
inserted, when an affidavit is evaluated to
determine probable cause. State v. Nielsen,
727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986). Also the
magistrate has discretion to define an
ambiguous term. State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d
987, 992 (Utah 1989). The court's duty is
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding probable
cause existed. Illinois \v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct.] at 2332. If the house discription [sic]
had been included
in the affidavit all the
-6-

facts and circumstances provided show there
was a fair probability contraband would be in
the house described. State v. Hansen, 732
P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) .
Ruling at 2-3 (R. 39-40) (a copy of the trial court's ruling, in
its entirety, is attached to this brief as Appendix C). Although
the trial court's reading of State v. Nielsen is suspect, its
ultimate conclusion that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for determining that probable cause existed was correct.
In State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court summarized the standards upon which a challenge to
a search warrant is reviewed:
The first question is whether the search
warrant was supported by probable cause. The
fourth amendment requires that when a search
warrant is issued on the basis of an
affidavit, that affidavit must contain
specific facts sufficient to support a
determination by a neutral and detached
magistrate that probable cause exists. State
v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986),
cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1565,
94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987). The affiant must
articulate particularized facts and
circumstances leading to a conclusion that
probable cause exists. Mere conclusory
statements will not suffice. Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317,
2333, 76 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983). The
magistrate's task is to make a "practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him [or her] . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place."
Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332; see State v.
Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986).
When a search warrant is challenged as
having been issued without an adequate
showing of probable cause, the fourth
amendment does not require that the reviewing
court conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate's probable cause determination;
instead, it requires only that the reviewing
-7-

court conclude "that the magistrate had ci
substantial basis for . . . [determining]
that probable cause existed." Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332
(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S..
257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697
(I960)); see State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715,
719 (Utah 1983); see generally 1 LaFave,
Search and Seizure § 3.1(c) (2d ed. 1987) . .
. . The reviewing court, in conducting that
examination, should consider a search warrant
affidavit "in its entirety and in a commonsense fashion." State v« Anderson, 701 P.2d
1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); see also State v.
Hansen, 732 P. 2d 127, 129-30 (Utah 1987) ("per
curiam)(applying this standard of review).
Finally, the reviewing court should pay
"great deference" to the magistrate's
decision. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct.
at 2331 (quoting Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590, 21
L.Ed.2d 637 (1969)) .
770 P.2d at 990-91.

See also State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54,

56-57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 16
(Utah 1990); State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).

The trial court correctly applied these standards in

concluding that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
determining that probable cause existed to

support the issuance

of a search warrant for defendant's residence.
Defendant correctly observes that paragraphs 16 through
18 of the affidavit prepared and sworn to by Officer Nielsen are
the only paragraphs that specifically refer to defendant's
residence.

They read, in context:

15. At about 1:05 p.m. a maroon colored mini
pick-up truck met with Taylor in front of
Five Star Auto. Taylor left approximately
five minutes later northbound on 1200 West.
16. Taylor via a long a [sic] circuitous
route arrived at 130 East 350 North in Orem.
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17. At 130 East 350 North, Orem, Utah,
resides Bryant Collard. Collard has
convictions for DUI and theft.
18. At 1:30 p.m. on April 29, 1989, I
watched as Rex Taylor handed to an unknown
white male in his 20fs wearing a bright green
shirt, a bag approximately the size of a
plastic grocery bag. The unknown white male
then turned and walked into one of the
houses.
19. Taylor then left and drove to his
mother's home located at 3460 North 475 East.
Affidavit at 2 (Appendix B).

In assessing the information

contained in paragraphs 16-18, the trial court noted that the
search warrant described defendant's residence in detail and the
affidavit did not.

Ruling at 3.

It concluded, however, that

"[t]he discrepency [sic] between the supporting affidavit and the
search warrant indicates that the house discription [sic]
probably was mistakenly omited [sic] from the affidavit."

Ibid.

Relying on State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987), for the proposition that "[o]mitted
information must be inserted, when an affidavit is evaluated to
determine probable cause," and on State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d at
992, for the proposition that "the magistrate has discretion to
define an ambiguous term," Ruling at 3, the court then concluded:
If the house discription [sic] had been
included in the affidavit all the facts and
circumstances provided show there was a fair
probability contraband would be in the house
described.
Ruling at 3 (citations omitted).
As previously noted, defendant's primary challenge to
the affidavit is that it failed to particularly describe the
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house which the "unknown white male" entered after he received
the bag from Taylor.

Indeed, paragraph 18 states merely that the

unknown white male "turned and walked into one of the houses"
(emphasis added).

The trial court sought to remedy this

deficiency by inserting a more detailed description of the house
into which the suspect walked by reference to the description of
defendant's home that appears in the search warrant.

However,

this procedure is flawed in two respects.
First, the trial court misinterpreted State v. Nielsen
as allowing insertion into the affidavit of omitted information
to render the affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause.
In Nielsen, the supreme court, in the context of deciding whether
there had been an invalid search under Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978), stated:
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court
held that a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to challenge the validity
of a search warrant if the defendant can
establish that (i) an affiant in an affidavit
supporting a search warrant made a false
statement intentionally, knowingly, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii)
the affidavit is insufficient to support a
finding of probable cause after the
misstatement is set aside. By an extension
of reasoning, the same test applies when a
misstatement occurs because information is
omitted; the affidavit must be evaluated to
determine if it will support a finding of
probable cause when the omitted information
is inserted.
727 P.2d at 191 (citations omitted).

Clearly, the supreme

court's allowance for insertion of infoirmation into an affidavit
was specifically tied to a false statement in the affidavit,
something that was not present in the instant case. Therefore,
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the trial court's reliance on Nielsen was misplaced, and its
insertion of information to bolster the affidavit with additional
3
information was improper.
Second, a lucre ck-tailed description of defendant's
house, without any iiii.'ormciti^n that the unidentified white male
entered that house, does little to cure the ambiguity inherent in
paragraph 18's statement that the suspect entered "one of the
houses•"
On the other hand, the trial court's reliance on State
v. Babbell for the proposition that the magistrate had the
discretion to define an ambiguous term in the affidavit (i.e.,
paragraph 18's reference to "one of the houses") was entirely
justified.

In Babbell, where the sufficiency of the affidavit

supporting a search warrant was challenged, the affidavit "set
out specifically and in detail the characteristics of the
[defendant's] truck as described by the witnesses [who observed
the defendant shortly before he sexually assaulted one of their
friends]."

770 P.2d at 992.

"It then explain[ed] that Cazier

[the affiant], a trained officer, had observed the truck from the
street and then more closely with the resident's permission and
There was no evidence before the trial court that the
magistrate had information, beyond that which appeared in the
affidavit, on what house the unidentified white male entered
after receiving the suspected contraband from Taylor. Officer
Nielsen, who swore to the affidavit, did not testify as to what
additional information, if any, he gave the magistrate prior to
the issuance of the warrant (SH. 14-22). And, Officer Teuscher,
who assisted in the preparation of both the affidavit sworn to by
Officer Nielsen and the search warrant signed by the magistrate,
acknowledged that he was neither present when Nielsen presented
those documents to the magistrate nor aware of any additional
information that Nielsen may have provided the magistrate at that
time (SH. 44-45, 53-54).
-11-

state[d] that defendant's vehicle "matches' the given
description."

Ibid.

On these facts the supreme court concluded:

We acknowledge that the affidavit is
ambiguous in its use of the word "match/' but
conclude that it was within the magistrate's
discretion to construe Cazier's statement
that Babbell's truck "matched the
description" to mean that the truck matched
with respect to those chartacteristics
expressly described in the affidavit. Once
that reasonable construction was made, the
magistrate had a "substantial basis" for
determining that there was a "fair
probability" that a search would uncover
evidence. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103
S.Ct. at 2332. The described characteristics
of the truck are sufficiently specific to
permit the magistrate to decide whether the
truck in the driveway was distinctive enough
to give him probable cause to believe that it
was the truck used in the crime and that a
search would produce evidence.
4
770 P.2d at 992 (footnote omitted).
Whether the affidavit in
the instant case was sufficient to establish probable cause to
search defendant's house is, as was a similar issue in Babbell, a

In the footnote omitted from this quote the court said:
Although we conclude that the magistrate
did not err in finding the affidavit
sufficient, we must observe that this is a
very close question. If the affidavit were
more vague, we might well reach the opposite
conclusion. Judges should be reluctant to
base a probable cause determination on so
poorly drafted an affidavit. The better
approach would be to require that an affiant
take the simple step of clearly and
unambiguously stating how the vehicle matches
the detailed description obtained from
witnesses. A few short minutes spent in more
carefully preparing this affidavit would have
ensured the protection of the accused's
constitutional rights while saving a
substantial amount of time for the courts and
the parties.
770 P.2d at 992 n.3.
-12-

very close question.

However, the magistrate, reading paragraphs

15 through 19 of the affidavit together, could have reasonably
construed paragraph 18 to mean that the unidentified white male,
after receiving the bag from Taylor, had entered the house at the
precise address where the suspected drug delivery had just
occurred, which was specifically identified in paragraphs 16 and
17 as 130 East 350 North, Orem, Utah, defendant's residence.
While the affidavit surely could have been more
artfully drafted, see Babbell, 770 P.2d at 992 n.3, a reviewing
court must consider an affidavit "in its entirety and in a
common-sense fashion," Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (quoting State v.
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985)), and recognize that
"affidavits 'are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and
haste of a criminal investigation [and that] [tjechnical
requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common
law pleadings have no proper place in this area.'"

Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 233, 235 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).

As also stated in Gates:

[W]e have repeatedly said that after-thefact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of
the affidavit should not take the form of de
novo review. A magistrate's "determination
of probable cause should be paid great
deference by reviewing courts." Spinelli,
supra, at 419. "A grudging or negative
attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants," Ventresca, 380 U.S., at 108, is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's
strong preference for searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant; "courts should not
invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting
affidavits] in a hyper technical, rather than
commonsense manner." Ld., at 109.
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We also have said that "[a]lthough in a
particular case it may not be easy to
determine when an affidavit demonstrates the
existence of probable cause, the resolution
of doubtful or marginal cases in this area
should be largely determined by the
preference to be accorded to warrants,"
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109
(1985). This reflects both a desire to
encourage use of the warrant process by
police officers and a recognition that once a
warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment
is less severe than otherwise may be the
case.
462 U.S. at 236, 237 n.10.
In sum, although admittedly a very close question, the
trial court, according the magistrate the high degree of
deference required by United States Supreme Court case law,
properly concluded that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for determining that there was probable cause to search
defendant's house.

Even though this is a marginal case, it

"'should be . . . determined by the preference to be accorded to
warrants.'"

Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 n.10 (quoting United States

v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)).

Cf. State v. Droneburg,

781 P.2d at 1305 (where the supporting affidavit, which contained
nothing more than conclusory statements of the affiant officer,
was so obviously insufficient that the State conceded there was
not a substantial basis upon which the magistrate could determine
the existence of probable cause).
B. Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
Even if this Court were to conclude that the affidavit
was inadequate to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis
for determining that probable cause existed, the evidence seized
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pursuant to the invalid warrant would nevertheless be admissible
under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States
Supreme Court held that federal constitutional guarantees against
unlawful search and seizure required exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence in state criminal trials.

However, in Leon the

Court carved out a "good faith" exception to that exclusionary
rule, "hold[ing] that evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable
reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate need not be excluded, as a matter of federal law, from
the case in chief of federal and state criminal prosecutions."
Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

The Court

said:
We conclude that the marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs
of exclusion. We do not suggest, however,
that exclusion is always inappropriate in
cases where an officer has obtained a warrant
and abided by its terms. H[S]earches
pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any
deep inquiry into reasonableness," Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S., at 267 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in judgment), for "a warrant
issued by a magistrate normally suffices to
establish" that a law enforcement officer has
"acted in good faith in conducting the
search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 823, n.32 (1982). Nevertheless, the
officer's reliance on the magistrate's
probable-cause determination and on the
technical sufficiency of the warrant he
issues must be objectively reasonable, cf.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819
(1982), and it is clear that in some
-15-

circumstances the officer will have no
reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant was properly issued.
Suppression therefore remains an
appropriate remedy if the* magistrate or judge
in issuing a warrant was misled by
information in an affidavit that the affiant
knew was false or would have known was false
except for his reckless disregard of the
truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978). The exception we recognize today
will also not apply in cases where the
issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his
judicial role in the manner condemned in LoJi Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319
(1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably
well trained officer should rely on the
warrant. Nor would an officer manifest
objective good faith in relying on a warrant
based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia
of probables cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.,
at 610-611 (POWELL, J., concurring in part);
see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 263-264
(WHITE, J.f concurring in judgment).
Finally, depending on the circumstances of
the particular case, a warrant may be so
facially deficient—i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the
things to be seized—that the executing
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be
valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post,
at 988-991.
468 U.S. at 922-23 (footnotes omitted).
The Leon good faith exception applies directly to this
case.

If the Officer Nielsen's supporting affidavit was

technically insufficient because it failed to indicate more
precisely that the unidentified white male entered defendant's
house, it was not so inadequate that the officers could not have
acted in objectively reasonable r€»liance on the warrant that was
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.

This is not a case

where the issuing magistrate was misled by knowingly or
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recklessly false information in an affidavit, or where the
magistrate wholly abandoned his role as a neutral and detached
judicial officer, or where the affidavit was "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable."

Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. Cf.

State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1305 (where the supporting
affidavit was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause" that the
State conceded "it was unreasonable for the officer who prepared
the affidavit to rely on a warrant issued on the strength of
it").

Quite to the contrary, this is a case where the officers

prepared a very detailed affidavit which, in hindsight, could and
should have more precisely identified defendant's house as the
house into which a suspected recipient of contraband had entered.
However, that defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that the
officers had "no reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant was properly issued."

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

In short,

the officers' reliance on the warrant issued was objectively
reasonable, and the deterrent purpose of the federal exclusionary
rule would not be served by excluding the challenged evidence
under the circumstances of this case.

Although in the trial court the State did not argue the Leon
good faith exception as an alternative ground for admission of
the challenged evidence, it is settled law that an appellate
court may affirm on any proper ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d
257, 260 (Utah 1985) ("[T]his Court may affirm the trial court's
decision on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
assigned another reason for its ruling.").
-17-

POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS ERRONEOUSLY CONVICTED OF BOTH
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITHOUT AFFIXING A
STATE TAX STAMP TO IT, AS THOSE OFFENSES ARE
INCLUDED OFFENSES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 761-402(3) (1990).
Defendant argues that possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1990), and possession of marijuana without affixing a
state tax stamp to it, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-19106(2) (Supp. 1990), are included offenses under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-402(3) (1990), and thus he could not properly be convicted
and sentenced for both offenses.

The State agrees.

Section 76-1-402(3) provides in pertinent part:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged[.]
The analysis for determining whether offenses are included under
section 76-1-402(3)(a) is set forth in State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96
(Utah 1983).

As stated in State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1191

(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988), the Hill test
has two components:
The principal test [for whether offenses are
included] involves a comparison of the
statutory elements of each crime. Subsection
76-1-402(3)(a) provides the definition of
lesser included offenses that is applied for
this purpose: an offense is lesser included
when M[i]t is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to
-18-

establish the commission of the offense
charged. . . . " Thus, where the two crimes
are "such that the greater cannot be
committed without necessarily having
committed the lesser," then as a matter of
law they stand in the relationship of greater
and lesser offenses, and the defenant cannot
be convicted or punished for both.
. . . .

The secondary test is required by the
circumstance that some crimes have multiple
variations, so that a greater-lesser
relationship exists between some variations
of these crimes, but not between others. A
theoretical comparison of the statutory
elements of two crimes having multiple
variations will be insufficient. In order to
determine whether a defendant can be
convicted and punished for two different
crimes committed in connection with a single
criminal episode, the court must consider the
evidence to determine whether the greaterlesser relationship exists between the
specific variations of the crimes actually
proved at trial.
743 P.2d at 1191 (quoting State v. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97)
(citations omitted).
Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) provides that it is unlawful:
for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless
it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while
acting in the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this
subsection[.]
Section 59-19-106(2) states:
In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a
dealer distributing or possessing marihuana
or controlled substances without affixing the
appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia
is guilty of a third degree felony.
The variation of section 59-19-106(2) proved at trial was
possession of marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it.
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Proof of this variation necessarily established the offense of
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) defined in
section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)• Therefore, the two offenses are
included offenses under the Hill test, and defendant could not
properly be convicted and punished for both.
Accordingly, the Court should vacate defendant's
conviction and sentence for possession of marijuana without
affixing a state tax stamp to it, leaving intact the conviction
7
and sentence for possession of a controlled substance.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a
controlled substance and vacate his conviction and sentence for
possession of marijuana without affixing a state tax stamp to it.

Had defendant been charged with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute under Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iv) (1990), there would be no included offense problem.
This is so because each offense would have required proof of an
element the other did not—i.e., section 59-19-106(2) requires
proof of the absence of a state tax stamp in addition to
possession, and section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) requires proof of
intent to distribute in addition to possession. See State v.
Cross, 649 P.2d 72, 73 (Utah 1982).
7
Both of defendant's convictions were for third degree felonies.
He does not indicate in his brief which conviction he wants the
Court to set aside. Because the code provides for enhanced
punishment for a subsequent conviction of marijuana possession,
see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(d) (1990), the State requests
that defendant's conviction of possession under section 58-378(2)(a)(i) be the conviction affirmed.
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AND APPLICATION FOR
SEARCH WARRANT
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF UTAH )

ss

I, Tom Nielsen, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and
say:
1.
That your affiant is a police officer for the City of
Provo, currently assigned to the Special Investigative Services
Bureau in the Narcotics Division.
2*
That officers of the Provo Police Department, acting upon
information received from several confidential informants and
verified by surveillance intercepted and followed a truck
belonging to Rex Taylor.
3.
The information received was that subject Taylor would be
transporting and delivering controlled substances, marijuana.
(See affidavit in support of and application for search warrant
executed by Officer Kim Collins on April 29, 1989 before the
Honorable Lynn W. Davis of the Fourth Circuit Court, a copy of
which is attached hereto and included herein as if set forth in
full.)
4.
Acting on the information your affiant went to S.D.S. Auto
at 825 West Center, Provo, Utah, looking for Taylor's truck which
is described as a black 1969 General Motors pick-up truck with a
black camper shell pulling a boat trailer.
5.
At 12:15 p.m. on April 29, 1989, I found the
Taylor on the lot at S.D.S. Auto. With Taylor was
identified in the affidavit attached hereto, and
which is a 1984 Chevrolet Blazer, model K10, Utah
and a vehicle that I recognized belonging to Scott
to be a co-owner of S.D.S. Auto.

truck and Rex
Bruce Draper,
his vehicle,
plate 524BSA,
Fazzio, known

6.
Rex Taylor's vehicle was parked on the east end of the lot
and was joined at the same spot by the above two vehicles and
occupants. They met and had conversation for approximately five
minutes, during which time an unknown white male left with a
brown paper bag about the size approximately six inches wide and
two inches thick and twelve inches long. Then all three vehicles
left S.D.S. Auto.

7.
Fazzio's car left eastbound on Center Street. Rex Taylor
and Bruce Draper drove westbound on Center Street in their
separate vehicles arriving at a small grocery store in the 1900
block of West Center.
8.
Taylor and Draper parked their vehicles in a grocery store
lot next to each other. They both left their vehicles and moved
about their vehicles for approximately five minutes.
9.
Taylor and Draper then left the grocery store lot driving
north on Geneva Road. Bruce Draper drove to his home at 1964
West 500 North. Taylor continued north on Geneva Road into Orem.
10. At approximately 12:45 p.m. on April 29, 1989, Taylor
arrived at a Protestant Church located approximately 300 South
1200 West, Orem, Utah.
11. There Taylor met an unknown white male driving a yellow Ford
pick-up truck who appeared to be waiting for Taylor. Taylor and
the unknown male conversed for about five minutes before driving
south on 1200 West in Orem.
12. Taylor and the unknown male in separate vehicles arrived at
Five Star Auto located at 600 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah, and
conversed for another five to ten minutes, while moving about
their vehicles on foot.
13. At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29, 1989, the yellow
pick-up truck left Five Star Auto northbound on 1200 West.
14. At the same time Taylor was conversing with the male in the
yellow pick-up at least two unknown white males exited Five Star
Auto and met with Taylor and the male.
15. At about 1:05 p.m. a maroon colored mini pick-up truck met
with Taylor in front of Five Star Auto.
Taylor left
approximately five minutes later northbound on 1200 West.
16. Taylor via a long a circuitous route arrived at 130 East 3 50
North in Orem.
17. At 130 East 350 North, Orem, Utah, resides Bryant Collard.
Collard has convictions for DUI and theft.
18. At 1:30 p.m. on April 29, 1989, I watched as Rex Taylor
handed to an unknown white male in his 20' s wearing a bright
green shirt, a bag approximately the size of a plastic grocery
bag. The unknown white male then turned and walked into one of
the houses.
19. Taylor then left and drove to his motherfs home located at
3460 North 475 East.
There Taylor made several trips between
his truck and his mother's house.

20. At approximately 2:00 p.m. an unknown white male arrived and
spoke with Rex near the rear door of the camper shell. At one
point Rex opened the camper shell door allowing the unknown male
to look in.
21. Shortly thereafter your affiant along with other officers
from the Provo Police Department and Utah County Sheriff's Office
arrived and took Rex Taylor and the other unknown individual into
custody.
In plain view in the cab of the pick-up truck was a
brown bag similar to the one delivered to the male at S.D.S. Auto
and a large quantity of twenty dollar bills.
In plain view
through the window in the door of the camper shell was a brown
plastic trash bag containing clear plastic zip-lock bags
containing a green leafy substance.
22. The truck was impounded and inventoried and approximately 12
to 13 pounds of marijuana was located in the back. The brown bag
in the cab also contained marijuana. Also found in the truck was
in excess of $25,000 cash.
23. Rex Taylor owns a home located at 4574 North Windsor Drive,
Provo, Utah, a short distance from the location where Rex Taylor
was arrested on April 29, 1989, as described above.
The
residence is further described as a larger home with brown brick
in the center, the north and south sides framed in cream uith
brown wood. There is a deck facing the front, from the south
side to the north side. The residence is on the east side ct
Windsor Drive. It has steps leading to the front door. The here
is on a steep incline. The home bears the number 4574 on the
south portion and the front portion by the curb. On the nortn
side of the building above the garage is a large room.
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AND APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT
STATE OF UTAH

>

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

se

I, Kim

Collins, being

first duly sworn on oath, depose and

say:
1.
That your affiant is a police officer for the City of Provo,
currently assigned to the Special Investigative Services Bureau
in the Narcotics Division.
la. Your affiant has knowledge in the use and sale of narcotics,
i.e. marijuana, cocaine, crystal methamphetamine. Your affiant
has received training from the Provo City Police Department, Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, and the Department zi
Justice, State of California. In November of 1988 your affiant
attended a forty-hour class on the identification and detection
of the aforementioned drugs.
Your affiant also has knowledge
that individuals involved in the illegal use and sale 01
narcotics frequently deal in large quantities of cash, and tr.at
said cash is normally broken down into envelopes marked with tne
amount to be delivered to each individual, and that marijuana 13
normally packaged in zlplock container bags, as well as crystal
methamphetamine and cocaine, and that scales and other measuring
devices are normally present at defendant's residence.
lb* I have developed contacts and have spoken with users,
manufactuers and traffickers of controlled substances, along with
informants and experts in the area of controlled substances
regarding the
manufacture
and
trafficking
of controlled
substances in the Utah County area.
I have negotiated for and
purchased controlled substances while acting in an undercover
capacity.
2.
On April 29, 1989 at 0830 hours affiant received a telephone
call from confidential informant informing me that a delivery of
20 to SO pounds of marijuana is to be made at 1964 West SQO
North, known as Leisure Village Trailer Park, Provo City, Utah.
The defendant delivering the marijuana is a Rex P. Taylor, date
of birth August 5, 1934, and the delivery is to be made to Jeff

racovary and aaizing of ona pound of marijuana. Tha marijuana
vif daacribad aa baing concaalad undarnaath a vaterbed, which 13
tha eama placa your affiant racovarad tha illagal eubetance.
A.

On February 28, 1969 confidential informant provided
information on the following individuals aa dealing
in narcotice.
a.

Douglaa Snow, date of birth Auguat 14, 1956, has
a criminal hiatory dating to 1976, including
alcohol and drug arreata. Snow alao reaides at
1964 West 500 North, Provo, Utah. Snow ia an
aaaoclate of Bruce Draper, and also haa a
telephone liated in hia name at aaid address,
phone number 373-6744.

b.

Rex P. Taylor, date of birth August 9, 1954, has
a criminal hiatory beginning in 1973 for alcohol
and drug arreats with convictions of possession
of controlled substance. Taylor ia believed to
be living in Laa Vegaa, Nevada and makee frequent
tripa to the Provo area every two weeke.

c.

Jack Wilkinson AKA Jackie Wilkinaon, date of
birth January 6, 1966, has arrests for alcohol,
narcotica, and burglary beginning from 1973 to
preeent.

d.

Bruce Draper, date of birth January 20, 1955, has
arreata for alcohol and drug involvement for the
past ten yeara, including arreats for possession
of controlled substancee.

4*
Confidential Informant has further provided the following
information that Jack Wilkinaon receivea marijuana from Bruce
Draper, who, in turn, purchaaea his marijuana from Rex P. Taylor.
5.
In January
of 1989
officera from Provo City Police
Department and
Utah County
Sheriff's Department conducted
eurveillancee at the reaidence of Bruce Draper in which vehicles
belonging to Rex Taylor, Douglas Snow, Jack Wilkinson were ail
seen parked at the reaidence of Draper.
6.
Your affiant has received further information from an
independent aource, a David J. Hecham, date of birth September 3,
1963. Your affiant interviewed Hecham on March 23, 1989, wherein
Hecham identified the following individuals dealing in narcotic

7.
Your affiant baiievea that a dalivary of marijuana and
crystal mathamphatamina will ba dalivarad to aaid addraaa by Rex
Taylor on thla data.
8.
Your affiant hat probabla cauaa to baliava that narcotic
trafficking la currantiy baing conductad at 1964 Weat 500 North,
Provo, Utah in a mobila homa locatad In Lalaura Village Trailer
Park, and that larga
amount* of
cryatal methamphetamme,
marijuana ara baing distributed from thla location.
9*
Baaed upon my training and experience I believe that a
search of tha property at 1964 West 500 North, Provo City, Utan
will result in the seizure of narcotics; i.a. cocaine, crystal
mathamphatamina and marijuana, and your affiant further requests
that based upon the aforementioned information and inveatigation,
a search warrant be iasued for items in vJtrSTmT^on of aaction 5637-8.

Subscribed and->aworn to before/me this

/

R C U I T

day

J U D G E
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APPENDIX B

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE

UTAH

COUNTY OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT

SEARCH

STATE OF UTAH

WARRANT

)
•

COUNTY OF UTAH )

THE STATE
OF UTAH to: Tom Nielsen, Provo Police Department, or
any other peace officer in the State of Utah in assistance?:
Proof of affidavit having been made before me this £9fh clay
of April,
1989, by Tom Nielsen of Provo City, Utah County, State
of Utah, that he has probable cause to
believe that evidence
involved in the use and sale of narcotics is currently located <-1
130 East 350 N North, Oreni, Utah.
Residence
is further described
as being a red brick house with ati aluminum screen door &ii(i has *
bright r&d asphalt shingle roof.
There D S a pine tree near thc>
center of the front
lawn and a small white mail box attached to
the front of the house next to the screen door with the numbers
130 on
it. A car port is on hte east side of the house, a blacl'
wrought iron hand rail on the
front steps and adjacent sidt^wcUk
leading to the front steps. There is a dark stone planter box on
the east side of the driveway.
Your affiant also requests
permission to search all rooms,
attics,
safes,
garage, out-buildings,
whether
attached
or
unattached,
surrounding
grounds,
storage
areas,
trac,h
receptacles, vehicle<s)
and
any and
all other
containers,
including but not limited to as follows:
1.

Evidence of conspiracy
including
books,
ledgers,
accounts payable and receivable, Buy-owe sheets,
contracts, letters, memoranda of agreement between
conspirators, formulas, receipts, telephone records,
phone books, address books, and other personal
property tending to establish a conspiracy.

2.

U.S. Currency

3.

Financial records of persons in control of the
premises, tax returns, bank accounts, loan
application, income and expense records, safe deposit
box keys, and records, property, acquisitions, And
notes.

control of said premises and/or v e h i c l e s ) , including
rent
receipts,
telephone
bills, 'utility
bills,
telephone/address books, cancelled mail, vehicle
registration, keys and photographs.
5.

Rifles, handguns, shotguns, along with any ammunition
for same.

6,

Methamphetamine, amphetamine, and ingredients used in
the production of methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine
both rock and powder, and any other illegal narcotj.cs>.

7.

Scales

8.

Record of drug transactions.

9.
Upon reading said information
supported by said affidavit,
the court
is of the opinion
and, therefore, finds there is
probable cause to believe that the facts stated in said affidavit
are
true, and
that evidence pertaining to the above-men LIOIIPCJ
case may be contained in the described location.
The
items to
Sections 58-37-8.

be

seized

are

evidence

of

violations of

This is a no-knock
search warrant to prevent the delay
discovery or destruction of narcotics at said location.

or

NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU are hereby commanded to
make a thorough
search
of the above-described residence and
vehicle and hereto seize
all evidence
pertaining
to the?
investigation as described by said affidavit, a,)id to make returns
promptly to this court of your doings under this writ.
You are further directed to bring.said evidence forthwith at
the above Fourth circuit Court, Provo Utah, County of Utah, or to
hold same in your
possession
pending
further notice of tins
court.

Dated this £9th day of April, 1989

Time J^g^^/P?

•

THIS WARRANT MAY BE EXECUTED ANY TIME DURING THE DAY OR NIGHT.
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN DAYS OF ITS ISSUANCE.

APPENDIX C

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

^

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
******

THE STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NUMBER CR 89 364

Plaintiff,
VS.

RULING

BRYANT COLLARD,
Defendant.

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
******

This matter came regularly before the court on the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

Deputy Utah County Attorney

James R. Taylor represented the State of Utah, and Shelden
Carter Esq. represented the defendant.

The court having read

the Motion makes the following Findings and Ruling.
FINDINGS
1.

The police came to Mr. Collard's home about 10:00

p.m. with a search warrant to search for drugs and
contraband.

The police were expecting to find marijuana.

To

avoid disrupting his family Mr. Collard assisted the police
in finding a pound of marijuana in the basement.

Defendant

now claims that the search warrant was not valid, because the
supporting affidavit did not show sufficient probable cause,
and any consent for the search was coerced.

2.

A search warrant must be supported by an affidavit

providing a nutral magistrate with substantial basis for
determining probable cause, which is based on a
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.

Illinois v. Gates.

462 U.S. 237, 238-9, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)

The

defendant contends that the search warrant was not valid
because the affidavit supporting the warrant does not show
sufficient probable cause.

Specifically the defendant says

the affidavit does not adequately describe the house and the
suspect involved.
3.

The affidavit gives detailed information about a man

named Rex Taylor who was suspected of delivering marijuana
for further distribution.
with a tip about Taylor.
observation.

An informant provided the police
This tip was verified by police

The affidavit describes a circuitous route with

frequent stops and brief interactions with several
individuals.

At the end of this route the police arrested

Taylor who had in his truck large quantities of marijuana and
cash.

All of these facts support a finding that Taylor was

in the act of distributing marijuana.

The defendant was one

of the individuals who had a brief exchange with Taylor.

The

affidavit states Taylor arrived at 130 East 350 North, Orem,
Utah; where Bryant Collard resides.

It then describes how

Taylor "handed to an unknown white male in his 20's wearing a
bright green shirt, a bag approximately the size of a plastic

grocery bag.

The unknown white male then turned and walked

into one of the houses."

The affidavit does not describe the

defendant or his home in any more detail.
4.

However, the search warrant does describe the house

in detail including the house number on the mailbox attached
to the house.

Whether the search warrant description is

adequate depends upon the facts of each case, and the
description is adequate if the officer with reasonbale effort
can identify the place.
1102 (Utah 1985).

State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,

The search warrant description in this

case should be sufficient for determining which house is to
be searched.
5.

The discrepency between the supporting affidavit and

the search warrant indicates that the house description
probably was mistakenly omited from the affidavit.

Omitted

information must be inserted, when an affidavit is evaluated
to determine probable cause.
191 (Utah 1986).

Also the magistrate has discretion to

define an ambigious term.
992 (Utah 1989).

State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,

State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987,

The court's duty is simply to ensure that

the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
probable cause existed.

Illinois at 2332.

If the house

discription had been included in the affidavit all the facts
and circumstances provided show there was a fair probability
contraband would be in the house described.
732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987).

State v. Hansen,

6.

Because great deference is given to the magistrate's

determination of probable cause, and sufficient facts were
present in this case to support the magistrate's finding of
probable cause, the search warrant issued is valid.

Any

further issue of whether there was consent to search does not
need to be addressed.
RULING
Defendant's Motion to Supress is denied.
Dated this 11th day of December, 1989.
BY THE COURT

//C^^Y
B0Y6 L. PARK, DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:

Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor
Sheldon R. Carter, Esq.

